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ABSTRACT: In “Belief in the Face of Controversy,” Hilary Kornblith argues for a radical 
form of epistemic modesty: given that there has been no demonstrable cumulative 
progress in the history of philosophy – as there has been in formal logic, math, and 
science – Kornblith concludes that philosophers do not have the epistemic credibility to 
be trusted as authorities on the questions they attempt to answer. After reconstructing 
Kornblith's position, I will suggest that it requires us to adopt a different conception of 
philosophy's epistemic value. First, I will argue that ‘progress’ has a different meaning in 
logic, science and philosophy, and that to judge one of these disciplines by the standards 
appropriate to one of the others obscures the unique epistemic functions of all. Second, I 
will argue that philosophy is epistemically unique in that it is a non-relativistic but 
historically determined excavation of foundations. Finally, drawing on Frank Herbert's 
Dune, I will suggest that Kornblith leaves us with a choice between two epistemic ideals: 
the hyper-logical ‘Mentat,’ or the historically informed ‘pre-born.’ 
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1. Introduction: The Mentat Ideal 
In Frank Herbert's popular series of science fiction novels, The Dune Chronicles, 
humankind has done away with complex machinery and conditioned itself to fill 
the void. Instead of computers, there are ‘Mentats.’ A Mentat is a human being 
with extraordinary logical capacities, able to solve extremely complex problems in 
a short time and make predictions with a very high degree of empirical accuracy. 
They receive information as input, and their output is truth. Mentats are still 
human, however; they marry, exhibit loyalty to their authorities, and have 
complex emotions. But if they begin to get carried away by those emotions, they 
need only remind themselves to "function as a Mentat" and their dominant 
rational side reasserts itself.1  
We can probably agree on two facts about Mentats. The first is that they 
seem like an excellent ideal for the philosopher to uphold. To be able to stop what 
one is doing, set aside emotions and passions, and function as a Mentat is surely a 
skill that any honest seeker of truth would want to cultivate. In contemporary 
                                                                
1 Frank Herbert, Dune (New York: Penguin, 1965), 17.  
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analytic epistemology, the paradigm of the epistemic agent is often something 
very like a Mentat. It is supposed that we receive evidence as input, process that 
evidence in accordance with the best methods and standards that we have 
available to us, and form true beliefs as output. Even if it is acknowledged that 
real-world circumstances might interfere with this process, it is taken by 
epistemologists of disagreement to be a suitable norm.  
The second fact is that Mentats belong in science fiction. As much as we 
would like to be able to cordon off error and the illusions of what William James 
called our passional nature, we know from experience that willpower and practice 
cannot reliably accomplish this. Look at the methodology of contemporary 
science, which demands of any individual researcher a full explanation of the 
procedures and materials she employs so that her experimental results can be 
replicated and verified by other scientists. Or take the academic process of peer 
review, which would hardly be necessary if we could all trust our qualified peers 
to reach proper conclusions given the same data that we have. These kinds of 
institutional checks are necessary because academics and scientists can be 
dishonest, but more fundamentally because we recognize that in the collective 
human search for truth, even the brightest and most honest individuals among us 
can – and often do – get things wrong. The Mentat is an artifact of imaginative 
fiction because the ideal is simply too good to be true.  
The epistemology of disagreement takes this constitutive imperfection of 
the rational animal as its starting point. If we were all capable of functioning as 
Mentats on cue, then substantive philosophical disagreements – indeed, any 
disagreements whatsoever that go beyond expressions of personal preference – 
would be systematically resolvable in short order. All the participants would have 
to do is feed each other the evidence and arguments available, and one of the 
parties would recognize their error. But this isn't, of course, what happens in the 
actual practice of philosophy. What happens is that we ask ourselves and each 
other a varied but limited number of fundamental questions, draw out problems 
and further questions from that basis, and then argue interminably about those 
questions and problems at conferences, in journals and private conversations, and 
even in our heads. As a matter of fact, to paraphrase James, we find ourselves 
disagreeing.  
What does this disjunct between the Mentat model and the messy human 
reality mean for philosophy? What conclusions ought we to draw about a practice 
whose results seem so apparently at odds with its ideals? Can these conclusions tell 
us what to do in the case of substantive disagreement with our colleagues? What is 
the philosophical significance of such disagreement? In "Belief in the Face of 
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Controversy," Hilary Kornblith confronts these questions head-on and ends up 
with some rather pessimistic conclusions about the epistemic authority of 
philosophy.2 My goal in this essay shall be to evaluate these conclusions and to 
determine, not just what philosophy can tell us about disagreement, but what 
disagreement can tell us about philosophy. 
2. Kornblith: The Question of Progress 
Kornblith begins his essay by delimiting the scope of the epistemological problem 
of disagreement. This reduction is necessary since, at first glance, disagreement is 
as ubiquitous as belief itself: from politics to religion to simple matters of 
geographical fact, it seems there is almost no topic about which people do not 
disagree. Not all disagreements are epistemologically significant, however. In some 
cases, I may have evidence that others do not have and know (or be reasonably 
certain) that if they had the same evidence, they would believe as I do. In other 
situations, I may have good reasons to doubt someone's judgment even if we have 
the same evidence. If I disagree about a simple addition problem with a child 
learning arithmetic, clearly it would not be proper for me to defer to the child's 
belief – no matter how certain she may be. Thus, in cases where I have good 
reasons to doubt my peer's judgment or their access to relevant evidence, 
disagreement poses no problem. Conviction itself is no guarantee of truth, or even 
a reliable indication of it.  
The epistemologically significant cases of disagreement are those 
concerning what Kornblith, following Gary Gutting, calls epistemic peers. If you 
and I are equally intelligent and well-educated, have access to and familiarity with 
the same evidence, and are both sincere about our beliefs, then we are epistemic 
peers. These three requirements are jointly necessary, and none alone is sufficient. 
If we add the proviso that the same interlocutor might be an epistemic peer with 
regard to one intellectual domain and not another, then we have the idealized 
interpersonal scenario presupposed by epistemologists of disagreement: a dialogue 
between humans doing their best to function as Mentats.  
To be sure, not all writers who make use of the idea of epistemic peerhood 
use it the same way. One of the more interesting complications of the idea is 
raised by Adam Elga.3 In addition to the criteria already discussed, Elga adds that 
epistemic peers must have broadly similar beliefs with regard to the topic under 
dispute. If you and I are both intelligent and generally well-educated, and we find 
                                                                
2 Hilary Kornblith, “Belief in the Face of Controversy,” in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman 
and Ted A. Warfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 29-52.  
3 See Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement,” Nous 41, 3 (2007): 478-502. 
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ourselves disagreeing about whether the animal that runs in front of us is a 
squirrel or a chipmunk, then I can disagree you with in this case and still consider 
you my epistemic peer. It may be that neither of us is especially well-qualified to 
discuss the physiology of small furry animals, but we nevertheless both have 
certain beliefs about other facts regarding chipmunks and squirrels: that they have 
tails and fur, they can climb trees, etc. The question could be resolved simply by 
reference to an illustrated encyclopedia.  
If, on the other hand, you are an idealist in the tradition of Berkley and I a 
strict materialist, then our disagreement about what we see is going to be less 
amenable to resolution. When you remark on the cute notion in God's mind that 
illusorily appeared to dart by, I might respond by saying that all I saw was a 
bundle of furry flesh traversing a plot of space-time. According to Elga, this 
disagreement is epistemically benign: because we are bringing such radically 
different sets of beliefs to the table, then our ground for considering each other as 
epistemic peers dissolves under us. Once we set aside all our differences pertaining 
to the question at hand, there remains no fact of the matter that would allow me 
to judge my faculty of judgment against yours. And without shared standards for 
comparison, the concept of epistemic peerhood is meaningless. 
Kornblith rejects Elga's additional criterion for epistemic peerhood. He 
argues that even in cases where beliefs appear to diverge so radically, there are 
nonetheless still common standards that both parties can appeal to. You and I may 
disagree about the metaphysical constitution of the critter in front of us, but we 
both agree that it is not a duck or a lacrosse stick; we both agree that it appeared to 
run from right to left; we both agree that it appeared to have four legs. Thus, I still 
have shared grounds for considering you my epistemic peer.  
Now, Elga might be willing to concede the point in this case. But surely, he 
might respond, there are other plausible cases where our relevant clusters of belief 
really do differ radically and irreconcilably. Kornblith's rebuttal attempts to draw 
a line between degrees of belief-similarity, and where there are degrees there are 
exceptions to any fixed rule. But a stronger rebuttal to Elga would be to insist that 
epistemic peerhood doesn't have anything to do with the content of beliefs at all. 
If you were not already my epistemic peer prior to our sighting the furry animal, 
then surely you wouldn't become one upon agreeing with me about what we have 
seen; conversely, if you were already my peer, then I ought not revoke this status 
when I discover that where I saw a squirrel running you saw a lacrosse stick being 
thrown. Certainly some response to the discrepancy is warranted, but as Kornblith 
suggests in the case of disagreements regarding perception, I have no more reason 
prima facie to think it is your error than mine. Generalizing the point, epistemic 
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peerhood is a matter of our trusting the judgmental faculties of another, not 
endorsing their particular conclusions. It is a sign of methodological competence, 
not empirical adequacy.  
For now, however, let us accept Kornblith's understanding of epistemic 
peerhood. The question of his essay is: what ought we as peers to do when we 
genuinely disagree with each other? Before examining Kornblith's answer, we 
note two important facts about the question itself. First, it is not a descriptive 
question but a normative one. As much as philosophers like to appeal to thought 
experiments and counterexamples to grease the axles of intuition, no appeals to 
juries or dinner bill calculations can answer the question on their own. Values 
must enter the discussion if it is to go anywhere at all. The second fact is that we 
can't appeal to some kind of latent but abstract error in calculation to come down 
on one side or the other. In other words, I can't answer the question by saying 
that if I am right then I should hold my ground, but if I am wrong then I should 
suspend judgment. No doubt this is true, but it evades the terms of the question 
inasmuch as both parties initially take their views to be right. The symmetry of 
epistemic peerhood must not be broken.  
How, then, does Kornblith advise us to act in the case of genuine 
disagreement with epistemic peers? Let's take the first form of the example 
discussed above. If I see a chipmunk running across the ground and you see a 
squirrel, clearly one of us cannot be right. The animal can't be both chipmunk and 
squirrel, so barring other relevant possibilities (the animal might be a groundhog) 
the law of contradiction demands that we come down on one side or another. 
Nevertheless, neither of us can support our belief with any immediate evidence 
beyond the simple attestation of perception. Thus, Kornblith concludes, the 
rational thing for us to do is to suspend judgment until we can consult the 
encyclopedia. Similarly, if you and I add up a dinner bill and come up with two 
different sums, one of us must be wrong; the logical thing to do in this case would 
be to suspend immediate judgment and recalculate the bill separately. 
What about philosophical disagreement? The widespread presence of 
disagreement in philosophy is evident from a look at any elementary ethics or 
metaphysics textbook. But what differentiates philosophy from simple perceptual 
or mathematical cases, according to Kornblith, is that disagreements in perception 
or math will or can be easily resolvable. All we have to do is look closer, or redo 
the calculations. But when philosophers disagree, they usually do so after having 
examined and considered all the relevant arguments. If they are truly peers, an 
externalist can't simply tell the internalist to look closer at the arguments to be 
convinced, nor can she appeal to some impartial third party as an authority (since 
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she and her peer are as authoritative as anyone else on the subject at hand). There 
may be no impartial way to resolve the dispute, even if we accept that both sides 
cannot be right. Granted, then, that philosophical disagreements differ 
importantly from more mundane cases, what should philosophers do in the case of 
genuine disagreement? 
Kornblith considers Thomas Kelly's answer that we must simply turn to the 
arguments and believe what they demonstrate, rejecting it for reasons similar to 
the ones considered above.4 Pragmatically speaking, a disagreement might well be 
clarified or even resolved if both parties lay out all the relevant arguments, 
explicitly asses their cogency and their reasons for finding the arguments cogent, 
and so on. But since beliefs may still (and often do still) differ after such careful 
analysis by both parties, the question remains as to how the disputants ought to 
react to the persistent disagreement.  
The way Kornblith develops his own answer to the question is interesting, 
and worth retracing. His most significant move is to expand the discourse beyond 
the two-party scenario often presupposed by epistemologists of disagreement, 
shifting the focus of the discussion to the tenability of dissent within a 
community. His guiding example here is Kelly's discussion of the Newcomb 
Problem, introduced into decision theory by Robert Nozick in 1969 and debated 
ever since.5 Kelly tells us that when the problem was first introduced, opinion 
among decision theorists was split more or less evenly, but that over the next 
three decades consensus shifted in favor of the two-box option. According to 
Kelly, these facts about the distribution of opinion should have no bearing on 
which decision we make now; we must stick to the arguments and make the most 
rational decision possible. For we can always imagine possible worlds in which the 
distribution of opinion had developed in the opposite way, or where it remained 
evenly split. In general, the line between possible disagreement and actual 
agreement is “an extremely contingent and fragile matter.”6 Thus, the lack of 
disagreement in a field – in a word, consensus – is no guide for making difficult 
decisions.  
Kornblith challenges Kelly on his own grounds. According to Kornblith, if 
we look at the actual history of formal areas of philosophy like logic and decision 
theory (along with mathematics), we have every reason to think that consensus in 
such fields is a reliable guide for making decisions. In their infancy, to be sure, 
                                                                
4 See Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” Oxford Studies in 
Epistemology 1 (2005): 167-196. 
5 Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” 182-185. 
6 Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement,” 181.  
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these fields gave rise a wide variety of opinions among practitioners. Kornblith 
notes that the uncertainty correspondent to this diversity extended to arguments 
as much as it did to results; it wasn't until these fields developed to a certain extent 
that we were able to recognize what concepts had resonance and what methods 
worked. But once they did develop, the passage of time brought with it increased 
sophistication and, concomitantly, increased consensus. From this, Kornblith 
draws a rather strong conclusion: 
Even among experts, of course, convergence of opinion is no guarantee of truth, 
but one would have  to be a radical skeptic about mathematics, logic, probability 
and decision theory to think that convergence of opinion is not, at this point in 
the history of these fields, evidence of truth. And at this point in the history of 
these fields, I think it is fair to say, radical skepticism is no longer a rational 
option.7  
In other words, it is not only irrational to think that mathematics and 
decision theory do not provide us with truth, it is irrational to think that the bare 
fact of consensus in these fields does not serve as evidence for their truth. It is not 
far from this conclusion to the strong normative one that wherever there is a 
consensus in controversial matters, one ought to believe what the experts believe. 
Kornblith admits that “convergence of opinion is no guarantee of truth” and 
encourages us to attend to the relevant arguments or evidence as closely as 
possible, but despite these apparent concessions, his normative prescription 
remains the same: whether you are a novice or expert, if there is a consensus, you 
must go with the consensus. 
Contra Kelly, it is of no import that we can imagine other possible worlds 
where the consensus might have turned out differently. Kornblith argues that we 
can certainly picture a world where Gödel's incompleteness theorem was not 
discovered by Gödel or wasn't discovered at all, but it would be difficult to picture 
a world where Gödel published his theorem and it was rejected by the 
mathematical community at large. Possible, but difficult, for it would require us to 
rescind our basic faith in the competence of mathematicians in a way that belies 
the actual progress made within the mathematical community over time. The 
simple fact that we can imagine worlds where the experts get everything wrong 
doesn't have any bearing on the fact that in this world, they tend to get things 
right over time. 
According to Kornblith, the basic normative principle operative in the 
restaurant bill case is the same in the cases of mathematics, logic, and decision 
theory. If I go out to dinner with 17 mutually distrustful friends who all want to 
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add up the bill separately, and everyone but me calculates the same sum, the 
obvious thing for me to do in this case is to accept that I have made a mistake. As 
Kornblith tells us,  
Things are no different if we move from dividing the bill at a restaurant to 
solving a problem in decision theory.8  
Increased complexity doesn't change the fact that the experts know best.  
But we ask again: what about philosophy? It's hard to think that Kornblith 
hasn't strayed from his focus a bit. In fact, he's effectively made his argument 
already; the case against the epistemic authority of philosophy is made entirely by 
analogy to fields like mathematics, decision theory, and the natural sciences. If the 
philosophical community was like the mathematical and scientific communities in 
the sense that there has been undeniable progress within the community over 
time, then we would be able to treat philosophers as reliable experts in their field 
and impart the same epistemic authority to them we do to individual scientists. In 
that case, where there was a roughly even divide on some controversial 
philosophical issue, we would be rationally compelled to suspend judgment on the 
issue. “But,” Kornblith tells us,  
surely it is not reasonable to believe that the philosophical community is like the 
mathematical or scientific communities in relevant respects. We don’t have a 
long history of steady progress on issues, and, as a result, the case for deferring to 
community opinion is thereby weakened.9  
And the case for the epistemic authority of philosophers – a case, we note, that 
Kornblith never bothers to make – is also thereby weakened. For where we see no 
track record of success in the field, we have no reason to trust the authority of the 
practitioners within that field.  
The conclusions that Kornblith draws from this argument are merciless. 
Because of the lack of progress in philosophy,  
the only conclusion we can reasonably reach is that there is no basis for opinion 
here on anyone’s part at all.10  
By Kornblith's standards, it would seem to be as irrational to hold a genuine belief 
about a philosophical matter – any philosophical matter – as it is to question 
whether consensus in logic is really evidence that logicians are converging on the 
truth. To hold such opinions would be as presumptuous as it would be to believe 
that my calculations were correct and those of my 17 dinner companions were 
                                                                
8 Kornblith, “Belief in the Face of Controversy,” 43. 
9 Kornblith, “Belief in the Face of Controversy,” 44. 
10 Kornblith, “Belief in the Face of Controversy,” 45. 
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wrong. By all means, Kornblith tells us, we should continue to swap arguments 
like low-value baseball cards and hold our little conferences to make noise out of 
our precious beliefs, but only so long as at the end of the day, we remind ourselves 
that it's all much ado about nothing. Kornblith calls this curious defeatism 
“epistemic modesty.” Others might call it a good reason to not do philosophy.  
3. Lessons From the History of Philosophy 
A natural first reaction to Kornblith's argument would be to reject the premise 
that philosophy hasn't made the same progress as the other disciplines discussed. 
No doubt progress of some kind has occurred in math and science, but surely it has 
transpired in philosophy as well. Suppose we take Plato and Aristotle to mark the 
beginning of systematic philosophy. Very few philosophers still believe in 
immaterial Forms that subsist independently of the material world, and even 
fewer believe that because of the superior constitution of their soul, philosophers 
ought to rule as kings. Aristotle's defense of the institution of slavery is no longer 
tenable, nor are his conclusions about the inferiority of women. Aside from some 
general platitudes about virtue and intellectual rigor, in fact, there is little in the 
philosophy of the ancient Greeks that many rational people endorse today. Is this 
not progress?  
As appealing as this approach seems on first glance, I think it is perhaps the 
weakest response to Kornblith. The kind of progress Kornblith has in mind isn't 
just a matter of there being a different set of beliefs now than there was two 
millennia ago, or even a century ago. As Kornblith says, even fashion exhibits such 
shifts in consensus. Progress implies cumulative change that converges on a fixed 
point. But there's certainly no track record of fixed conclusions that we can point 
to as evidence of progress in philosophy. Even in ethics, the domain that 
philosophers most often try to reserve for themselves against the encroachment of 
modern science, what we see isn't linear progress so much as perpetual shifts in 
disagreement. Philosophers might not fancy themselves to be kings anymore, but 
they're not much help in telling us who ought to rule instead. 
If we accept Kornblith's definition of progress, then, philosophy has 
exhibited little to none. But where does this definition come from? We know 
Kornblith's answer: it is simply the name for the successive advance towards truth 
evident in formal philosophy, math, and natural science. But does it really make 
sense to talk about progress in logic and progress in physics as if they were the 
same phenomenon? Philosophers of science like Kuhn and Lakatos have served 
the valuable function of reminding us that progress in physics is not nearly as 
clear-cut as we like to think, and there is an important sense in which theories 
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and observational data are incommensurable from one research program to the 
next. But suppose we accept for the sake of argument that progress in physics is 
clear-cut: what relation does the ability to predict and experimentally verify the 
behavior of natural objects have to progress in logic? Logicians make no 
predictions and conduct no experiments. There is nothing in the realm of nature 
that confirms the law of noncontradiction, or demonstrates that the fallacy of 
ambiguity is a fallacy. The only thing that logical progress and scientific progress 
seem to have in common is that they are marked by increasing consensus. But if 
the bare fact of expert consensus can't be proof of progress just on its own, it 
certainly can't serve to indicate truth either.  
Perhaps consensus in logic – and mathematics, for that matter – is nothing 
more than the inevitable outcome of a large group of intelligent people finding the 
most agreeable ways to manipulate symbols of their own making. Maybe such a 
view is mistaken, but no one is going to demonstrate that with an experiment in 
the lab. If I claim that water flows upwards, on the other hand, a simple 
experiment could prove me wrong. Physics and logic don't share methods, objects, 
arguments, or procedures of confirmation and falsification; why should they share 
the same standard of progress?  
The point here isn't just that Kornblith is glossing over some very important 
details – although he is – but rather that he is strewing loaded terms across such a 
diverse terrain that they cease to have any useful meaning at all. I doubt that the 
truth of physics has much in common with the truth of logic, if indeed the latter 
really gives us what ought to be called truth. Moreover – and this is the important 
point – even if the sense of truth in those fields was in some important sense 
congruent, I see no reason at all to think that the further extension to fields like 
metaphysics or epistemology is valid. Kornblith is committing his own fallacy of 
ambiguity here, and doing so with one of the most notoriously slippery terms of 
our language. Philosophers can't even agree on what truth is; what gives Kornblith 
the epistemic authority to throw around the term as if we all, philosophers and 
scientists alike, had come to a consensus about what it meant?  
This lacuna in Kornblith's argument wouldn't be so important if he weren't 
basing his entire argument on what amounts to an analogy between philosophy 
and other disciplines. But, as we have emphasized above, this is precisely what he 
is doing. This move seems especially egregious since, in the same article, Kornblith 
has stated that disagreement in perceptual or mathematical cases seems 
importantly different than disagreement in philosophy. In math or science (where 
conclusions are ultimately supported by reports of perceptual observation), there 
is typically an accepted method of confirmation that we can turn to in the case of 
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disagreement. But in philosophy the path from disagreement to resolution is rarely 
so apparent. I'd happily go a step further: when it comes to philosophy, I'm not so 
sure that resolutions or solutions always exist. 
Here Kornblith might remount his attack. If philosophical problems can't 
be solved - or, what amounts to the same, if we don't know what it would mean to 
solve them - then surely philosophy never had any epistemic authority to begin 
with. What good is a problem that can't be solved, or a theory that can't be 
confirmed? I think the correct answer is that they do a great deal of good, or in 
any case, have a significant impact. As any philosopher in our dying western 
Lyceum will readily tell you, the study of philosophy has all kinds of practical 
benefits at the introductory level: it sharpens critical thinking skills, encourages 
close reading, makes us question assumptions and assumptions behind 
assumptions, and perhaps even casts doubt on the idea that holding a fixed set of 
beliefs is really the most rewarding and productive way to employ one's rational 
capacities. 
We need not stop at philosophy 101, however. Philosophy also has 
influence on the world-historical scale. Hegel is typically lambasted as the 
caricature of an abstruse, hopelessly abstract metaphysician, but without Hegel 
there would have been no Marx and the twentieth century would  have turned 
out very differently. If we look at Eastern philosophers like Confucius, the ‘real 
world’ applications are even deeper and more pervasive. Moreover, philosophy has 
served as the cradle for virtually every other major intellectual discipline. Without 
Aristotle, there would have been no political theory, aesthetic criticism, 
psychology, physics, biology, optics, etc. Without Plotinus, there would be no God 
as Christians understand that concept in the West today. If Kornblith wants to 
deny the epistemic authority of philosophers on the ground that they don't do 
what the scientists do, he would do well to remember that without philosophy 
there would be no science as we know it.   
In sum, Kornblith introduces the dimension of history into the 
epistemology of disagreement without bothering to make the slightest effort to 
understand what makes the history of philosophy unique, or valuable, or 
epistemically significant. If he had done so, he would have realized that 
philosophy doesn't make progress like physics does because it is a discipline 
concerned with foundations, and each new epoch in human history brings with it 
different requirements for such foundations. Cartesian mechanism was both 
product and mirror of its age, as was Aquinas' scholasticism, Nietzsche's aesthetic 
anti-nihilism, Quine's holism, and Kornblith's own blithe scientism. One need not 
be a relativist to understand that different eras in history give rise to different 
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problems and accept different kinds of answers, and one would be myopic to deny 
that philosophy has accomplished the task of formulating and propagating such 
questions for longer and at a deeper level than any other intellectual enterprise 
launched by humankind. The movement of philosophy does not proceed from 
point A to point B, but from point A to the ground beneath it; if it so happens that 
it digs all the way through and ends up on the other side of the world speaking a 
foreign language, ought we to deny its epistemic authority on the grounds that it 
didn't take the path we thought it would? 
4. Conclusion: Mentats and the Pre-born 
The world of Dune is a veritable epistemological funhouse. In addition to the 
Mentats, Herbert gives us a very different – and much stranger – model of 
superhuman intellectuality. The ‘pre-born,’ as Herbert names them, are human 
beings who are exposed to a certain type of drug (the melange spice) while still in 
the womb and thereupon come immediately to mature consciousness. But that's 
not all: once exposed to the drug, they are imbued with the complete memories of 
every ancestor in their genetic line. They carry these memories with them for 
their entire lives, and as such, are able to draw upon an unimaginably vast 
reservoir of historical experience to guide them along their own paths. Because 
they have (vicariously) seen it all before, the pre-born are impeccable judges of 
human behavior, and exhibit a kind of stoic remove from the complications of 
everyday life. They don't have the problem-solving prowess of the Mentat, but 
they have something better: the ability to understand why and how problems 
arise in the first place, and to judge their significance for the human condition as it 
stands in their historical moment. Perhaps it is for this reason that it is the pre-
born who always end up on the throne, and Mentats who end up serving them. 
Few educated people in our own world, aside from radical skeptics and the 
credulously religious, are likely to deny the epistemic authority of scientists and 
mathematicians. The ability to function as a Mentat might be beyond the power of 
any living human, but the factor of time and the contributions of the community 
make up for this lack: scientific disciplines accomplish collectively and 
diachronically what the Mentat accomplishes individually and synchronically. I 
proposed at the start of this essay that the Mentat ideal is also a suitable model for 
the philosopher. For scientifically-minded, results-oriented thinkers like 
Kornblith, it might well be. But if my objections against Kornblith in this essay 
have been successful, then I hope to have laid the ground for a different kind of 
ideal. Those adhering to this ideal would shift their attention to the historical 
foundations and precedents for what comes to be. They would pay more attention 
Disagreement and Philosophical Progress 
127 
to the genetic causes and conceptual roots of contemporary problems than they 
would to finding the quickest solution to those problems. They would find an 
altogether more suitable ideal in the pre-born. 
This divide between the Mentats and the pre-born might be taken to map 
onto the divide between analytic and continental philosophy in interesting ways, 
but within the confines of this essay I can't pursue this idea. My concern is to 
suggest that although they may adopt different methods, deal with different 
problems in different ways, and ultimately come up with different results, neither 
of these ideals intrinsically holds any more epistemic authority than the other.  
There's nothing wrong with holding some philosophy up to the standards 
set by modern mathematics and science, so long as the philosophy in question is 
similar enough to those fields in relevant ways. But there is also nothing wrong 
with practicing philosophy as an autonomous discipline, judging it by its own 
standards and in accordance with its own historical successes and failures. If we do 
the latter, questions of progress and consensus simply don't matter as much as 
Kornblith thinks they do. The practical virtues of philosophy persist unperturbed 
in either case, so as far as I can tell there is no normative basis for choosing one 
over the other. But whichever way we go, thousands of years of endlessly 
fascinating ideas clamor to be acknowledged, heeded and heard anew. The 
question is whether we want to hear them. 
 
